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I. FIRST DOWN: INTRODUCTION
HIS college football team finished the 2002 season as the number
one ranked team in the nation. In doing so, it completed its 26th
straight winning season and won its fourth straight conference
championship with a record of 11-1. Its .844 winning percentage over
those twenty-six years is the best in college football-better than Ne-
braska, Miami, Notre Dame and Michigan. The head coach, in his 23rd
season, has the best winning percentage of any active coach in college
* Christopher B. Norris will receive his J.D. from SMU Dedman School of Law in
May of 2004. He would like to thank Doug Hauschild for his assistance in gathering infor-
mation about UD athletics and Will Themer for his invaluable assistance in the preparation
of this article. He would also like thank his wife, Dawn, for bringing Grace into his life.
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football and reached the 200-win plateau faster than legendary coaches
Joe Paterno of Penn State, Tom Osbourne of Nebraska, Bobby Bowden
of Florida State, and Paul "Bear" Bryant of Alabama. A former
quarterback is now one of the most recognizable names in professional
football, having recently led his National Football League (NFL) team to
a victory in the Super Bowl. The school has had 32 football Academic
All-Americans, fourth in Division I behind Nebraska, Notre Dame, and
Ohio State. In 2002, the team played its home games in front of an aver-
age crowd of ... 5,260 people. Meet the University of Dayton (UD)
Flyers football team.
Dayton, Ohio is a basketball town and, particularly, a Flyer basketball
town. UD Arena, which sits approximately 200 yards from the football
stadium, regularly entertains sellout crowds of over 13,000 rabid fans for
men's basketball games. The hoops team has ranked in the top twenty-
five in attendance for Division I basketball over the last three-years. And
while the basketball team is currently enjoying a streak of three straight
twenty-win seasons, including a four-seed in the 2003 NCAA Basketball
Tournament, basketball attendance between the 1992-93 and 1994-1995
seasons was well over 10,000, despite the fact that the team won a total of
seventeen games during that three-year span. What could possibly be the
source of this disparity of enthusiasm between UD's basketball and foot-
ball program?
One possible answer is that fans are drawn to the level of competition
and the seemingly higher stakes involved with UD's basketball team.
This explanation has its genesis in the National Collegiate Athletic Asso-
ciation's (NCAA) organization of its member institutions and, particu-
larly, the organization of Division I members based upon the strength of
their football programs. As part of a Division I program, UD basketball
competes at the highest level of college basketball and has an opportunity
every year to participate in one of college athletics most compelling
events, the NCAA Basketball Tournament. But the Flyer football pro-
gram is relegated to a subcategory of Division I called Division I-AA. 1
Division I-AA schools participate in a playoff system to decide a cham-
pion and do not compete in the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) that is
the source of so much controversy every football season. Stated more
simply, the basketball team competes against opponents that fans see on
television and read about in newspapers everyday, while the football
team's opponents are likely to be relatively unknown to fans.
The football program at Southern Methodist University (SMU) is an
illustration of another phenomenon concerning attendance at sporting
events-fans are attracted to winning. SMU is located in the heart of
1. To be precise, Dayton participates in Division I-AA Non-Scholarship, a growing
"sub" subdivision of Division I-AA that has yet to acquire enough schools to warrant a
separate NCAA championship. The Flyers finished the season as the top-ranked I-AA
Mid Major team-a collection of teams that play at the non-scholarship or limited scholar-
ship level. By the way, Jon Gruden, current head coach of the World Champion Tampa
Bay Buccaneers, is a former Flyer quarterback.
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Dallas, Texas, the ninth largest city in the country. In 2000, it completed
construction of Gerald J. Ford Stadium, a 32,000-seat facility that includes
a first-rate locker room and training center. SMU provides the maximum
number of scholarships allowed by the NCAA for Division I-A programs
and has a full complement of coaches. In 2002, the Mustangs averaged
18,292 in home paid attendance, well above the 17,000 NCAA minimum
requirements for Division I-A status. But a closer look reveals the impact
of a 3-9 season on fan support. The excitement of a new season and the
first game for new head coach Phil Bennett resulted in a paid attendance
of 25,744 for the Mustangs' 37-7 opening day loss to Navy, a team that did
not win a game during the 2000 season. The excitement lasted another
week as SMU hosted Texas Tech University in front of a packed house of
32,000 who watched the Red Raiders hand the Mustangs another defeat.
But, through the last four home games of the season, SMU averaged just
13,002 in paid attendance per game, well below the 17,000 that the
NCAA requires its schools to average for home attendance.2
There are a variety of reasons why a school like UD decides to concen-
trate its efforts, and financial resources, on its basketball program, while
relegating its football program to second-tier status, or why SMU has
chosen to invest so heavily in its football program, despite the uphill bat-
tle it faces. Some of those reasons include conference affiliation, national
reputation, prestige, geographic region, and tradition. One of the most
significant factors in an institution's decision whether to attempt to field a
top-tier football program is certainly the NCAA requirements for each
division. The NCAA Board of Directors dictates financial, scheduling,
attendance, and facility requirements for member institutions in Division
I, Division II, and Division III. The consequences for failing to meet
these requirements can subject an institution to "enforcement proce-
dures" or reclassification by the NCAA.3 "Enforcement procedures"
may include suspension or termination of membership, 4 which, inter alia,
has the effect of blackballing the institution from athletic competition
with any other NCAA member 5 and preventing the institution from com-
peting in any NCAA Championship.6
Recently, the NCAA adopted dramatic changes in its Division I-A re-
quirements that will affect the future status of current Division I-A mem-
bers and Division I-AA schools who desire to participate in Division I-A
football. Many large, successful Division I-A programs will not be af-
fected by this change, but there are some Division I-A schools, including
SMU, that may be in danger of losing that status when the new require-
ments become effective on August 1, 2004. Particularly, many "mid-ma-
jor" programs playing in conferences such as the Western Athletic
2. See WAC Football (SMU team Page), at www.wacsports.com/stats.asp?page=stats/
football/2002/smu.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
3. 2002-2003 NCAA DIviSION I MANUAL § 3.2.4.2 (Michael V. Earle ed., 2002).
4. Id. § 3.2.5.1.
5. Id. § 3.2.4.8.
6. Id. § 20.8.1.
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Conference (WAC), the Sun Belt Conference, and the Mid-American
Conference (MAC) are at a great risk of losing their Division I-A classifi-
cation under the new rules. 7
The most important advantage to membership in Division I-A is finan-
cial. This advantage is the result of regional and national television expo-
sure as well as opportunities to participate in bowl games or the national
championship game, though that is limited by the structure of the Bowl
Championship Series (BCS). More importantly, the financial benefits
come regardless of individual success, since television and bowl revenue
are pooled and divided among the teams playing in a particular confer-
ence. 8 Hence, the success of one team in a small conference may provide
a windfall for every school in that conference.
This comment will focus on the possible procompetitive justifications
and anticompetitive effects of these new criteria on Division I-A schools
and, ultimately, whether these new criteria create antitrust liability for
the NCAA. While all of the new requirements raise some antitrust ques-
tions, the amendment that is likely to invite the most controversy is the
change in the home attendance requirement for Division I-A programs.
Previously, Division I-A schools were required to average 17,000 in ticket
sales per home football game. Under the new requirements, a school
must "demonstrate an average actual attendance of at least 15,000 for all
home games." 9 The change from paid attendance to actual attendance is
particularly troublesome because home attendance is often a factor of
externalities beyond an institution's control. While colleges and universi-
ties can exercise some control over paid attendance through marketing,
promotions, ticket prices and corporate sponsorship plans, actual attend-
ance may be determined by the whims of the local sports fan. In addition
to some of the factors listed earlier such as level of competition and win-
loss record, actual attendance can also be affected by the weather, the
starting time of the game, or how many of the opponent's fans make the
trip.
Part II of this comment will lay the framework for a discussion of the
NCAA's possible antitrust liability. The first task is to understand the
structure of the NCAA, particularly how it organizes its members into the
various classifications. Second, it is important to understand the eco-
nomic realities of college athletics and the vast "rich-poor gap" that exists
between institutions, even those within the same classification. Third, it is
important to understand what the current rules require, what the new
rules will require, and some of the motivations that led to the change.
The last foundational brick to be laid is to create a general understanding
7. New NCAA Rules Big Hurt on Small Schools, at http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/
761452.asp (last visited June 3, 2002).
8. Financial Lowdown: Full Reports, at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/si-online/
news/2002/03/15/conference-reports (last visited Mar. 15, 2002).
9. Adopted Membership-Division I-A Requirements, at http://www.ncaa.org/
databases/ legislation/2001/2001-123.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2003).
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of American antitrust law and the assorted terms and theories that would
play a part in any cause of action against the NCAA.
Part III will address a few of the preliminary questions that must be
answered before a full analysis of the NCAA's possible antitrust liability
can begin. At least some preliminary thought should be given to whether
NCAA requirements for its member institutions are the manifestation of
a conspiracy. Assuming that a conspiracy exists, recent caselaw suggests
that there is some confusion as to whether antitrust law applies to NCAA
rules at all. Presuming applicability, it is critical to determine the exact
type of antitrust behavior undertaken and the appropriate standard to
apply. Finally, Part IV will apply the appropriate standard to each of the
rule changes and discuss the NCAA's possible antitrust liability.
II. SECOND DOWN: BACKGROUND
A. DIVIDING UP THE NCAA
As of September 1, 2002, the NCAA was composed of 1,033 colleges
and universities, with over 361,000 men and women participating in inter-
collegiate athletics. 10 These institutions are divided into three general
categories: Division I, Division II and Division III. Each category has
particular participation, scheduling, and financial aid requirements and
limitations. For example, Division I schools are required to sponsor four-
teen varsity sports, with a minimum of seven men's teams and seven wo-
men's teams, all of which are required to play a high percentage of
contests against other Division I opponents. Division II schools must
sponsor four men's and four women's sports, while Division III schools
are required to sponsor five men's and five women's sports. Athletic fi-
nancial aid is more limited in Division II than Division I and prohibited at
Division III schools."I
The 325 Division I schools are divided into three sub-categories that
relate to their football program: Division I-A, Division I-AA and Divi-
sion I-AAA. Division I-AAA schools do not compete in football, but
still meet the Division I requirements to compete at that level in all of
their other sports. Division I-AA institutions field a football team,
though not all schools offer scholarships for the sport, and have limited
requirements in terms of scheduling. Division I-A teams compete at the
highest level of college football and, accordingly, require the highest level
of financial, personnel, and facility commitment to their football
programs. 12
10. Composition of the NCAA, at http://wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/member-
ship-svcs/ membership-breakdown.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2003).
11. See What's the difference between Divisions 1, 11 and III?, at http://www.ncaa.org/
about/ divscriteria.html (last visited on Feb. 9, 2003).
12. See generally id.
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B. THE BUSINESS OF COLLEGE ATHLETICS
Naturally, the financial commitment an institution is required to make
to its athletic program is significantly greater in Division I than Division
II and Division III and greater in Division I-A than in Division I-AA and
I-AAA. For example, the average total expenses in 1999 were twenty
million dollars for a Division I-A athletic program, $5.4 million for a Di-
vision I-AA program, and $4.7 million for a Division I-AAA program.
Division II schools with a football program spent an average of $1.9 mil-
lion, while schools without a football team spent $1.4 million. Division
III athletic departments who fielded a football team spent an average of
$663,000 in 1999, while Division III programs without a football team
spent only $351,000.13
The same NCAA study showed that Division I-A institutions brought
in $21.9 million in average total revenue in 1999, but that number is
skewed by the success of top-tier football schools. While sixty-four per-
cent of those schools turned a profit on their football program,14only
forty-nine of the 114 Division I-A athletic programs turned a profit with-
out university support.15 Athletic departments with football teams at the
top of Division I-A can make as much as $15 million a season in stadium
revenue alone.16 The year after its national championship season in 1998,
the University of Tennessee (UT) brought in $3.3 million dollars in just
merchandising revenue. That figure dropped to 2.4 million by 2001, but is
still well above the $1.5 million it averaged in the two years leading up to
the national title game.17 A recent report estimated UT's athletic revenue
at "more than $35 million" and Louisiana State University's (LSU) ath-
letic website listed its athletic department's annual revenue at over $37.5
million.1 8
These same major football programs also have the opportunity to ap-
pear on national and regional television regularly, opening up millions of
dollars in additional revenue. A side effect of this particular benefit is
that television revenue is often required to be shared with other confer-
ence members, meaning teams with little national visibility who play in a
major conference, such as Vanderbilt University, line their pockets with
revenue generated by the success of recent conference champions such as
UT, Florida, LSU, and the University of Georgia. In 2000, the Southeast-
13. NCAA Fact Sheet, at http://www.ncaa.org/about/fact-sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 9,
2003).
14. Id.
15. Bill Brewer, Big Orange, the Color of Money, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, (Sept.
15, 2002), http://www.knoxnews.com/cr/cda/article-print/1,1250,kns_347-1417723,00.
16. Roger G. Noll, The Business of College Sports and the High Cost of Winning, THE
MILLIKEN INSTITUTE REVIEW 24, 27 (Third Quarter 1999).
17. Gary Lundy, Licensing Now Source of Big Bucks for UT, Other Schools, KNOX-
VILLE NEWS SENTINEL (Sept. 15, 2002), at http://www.knoxnews.com/kns/business/article/
0,1406,KNS_376_1417496,00.html.
18. Brewer, supra note 15, at http://www.knoxnews.com/cr/cda/articleprint/
1,1250,kns_347_1417723,00.html; Inside LSU Athletics, at http://www.lsusports.net/ad/
randomlink-printable.cfm?pagecode@hletics (last visited July 13, 2003).
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ern Conference distributed over $79 million dollars between its twelve
member schools for an average of $6,585,468. Similarly, the Big Ten Con-
ference paid out over seventy-eight million dollars to its eleven members
for an average of $7,171,462, the Big 12 Conference split $57 million for
an average of $4,771,584 per school, and PAC-10 Conference schools took
home an average of $5,412,345.19 The lion's share of the money dispersed
came from football television rights or payments for participation in bowl
games at the end of the season, which are also split between conference
members.20 All of these figures are prior to the six billion dollar televi-
sion licensing agreement brokered between the NCAA and two televi-
sion networks that went into effect in September of 2002.21
The aforementioned "mid-major" conferences did not fare so well in
2000. The WAC split $2.6 million among its ten members; the Mid-Amer-
ican Conference distributed an average of $103,003 to its thirteen mem-
bers; and the Sun Belt split up a little less than $1.2 million between its
ten members. All three conferences operated at a loss in 2000. In fact,
the combined total revenue of all three conferences, $8,827,707 is not sig-
nificantly higher than the average payouts to one school in the major con-
ferences.22 Indeed, the canyon between the "haves" and the "have-nots"
in Division I-A has never been greater.
C. THE OLD AND NEW CRITERIA
The NCAA sets stringent requirements for Division I-A programs in
an effort to maintain the level of competition that college football fans
have come to expect. In addition to the other Division I requirements, I-
A schools must play sixty percent of their football games against a Divi-
sion I-A opponent23 and average 17,000 in paid attendance per home
football game24 (or 20,000 for all of its games) 25 over a rolling four year
period. An exception can be made if an institution is a member of a
NCAA member conference that "conducts championship competition in
the sport of football" where at least six members sponsor football.26 If
more than half of the football-playing institutions in that conference meet
the attendance requirement for the previous four years, the delinquent
institution may retain its Division I-A status.27 In addition, the stadium
in which a Division I-A program plays its home games must "contain a
19. Final Lowdown: Full Reports, at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/sionline/news/
2002/03/15/conferencereports.
20. See id.
21. Brewer, supra note 15, at http://www.knoxnews.com/cr/cda/articleprint/
1,1250,KNS_347_1417723,00.html.
22. Final Lowdown: Full Reports, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/sionline/news/2002/
03/15/conference-reports.
23. 2002-2003 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 3, § 20.0.6.2.
24. Id. § 20.9.6.3(a).
25. Id. § 20.9.6.3.3.
26. Id. § 20.9.6.3.2. For example, the Big 12 Conference, Southeastern Conference
(SEC), and Western Athletic Conference (WAC) are in this category.
27. Id. § 20.9.6.3.2.
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minimum of 30,000 permanent seats, '2 8 though this requirement, as well
as the paid attendance requirement, can be waived by a two-thirds major-
ity vote of the Management Council representing Division I-A confer-
ences if "circumstances exist that are beyond the control of the
institution. '2 9 There are a number of additional rules related to meeting
the paid attendance minimum, including: conditions for counting student
attendance, calculating seats sold in luxury boxes, and setting a minimum
price for counted tickets. 30
On April 25, 2002, the NCAA gutted the previous Division I-A re-
quirements in favor of a streamlined approach that sets five conditions
for Division I-A membership. The stated rationale of the new standards,
which become effective on August 1, 2004, is to ensure that all Division I-
A institutions exhibit similarities in their "level of competition, resource
allocation and public support."'3' First, a school must provide an average
of ninety percent of the maximum number of football scholarships 32 al-
lowed over a rolling two-year period. Second, each school must play at
least five home games each season against another Division I-A oppo-
nent. Third, the school must sponsor at least 16 varsity sports, two more
than the normal Division I minimum, with a minimum of six men's sports
and eight women's sports. Fourth, the school must offer a minimum of
200 athletic scholarships or offer four million dollars in athletic financial
aid. 33 Last, the school must average 15,000 in attendance for all of its
home football games. 34
The changes will not only raise the bar for many schools already strug-
gling to retain their Division I-A status, they also purposefully eliminate
several waivers of the Division I-A criteria.35 No longer can a program
be saved by a vote of the Management Council36 or the success of its
conference partners. 37 Nor can a school schedule away games against
schools that draw high attendance to meet the exception for averaging
20,000 in attendance for all games.38 Additionally, the attendance re-
quirement is no longer calculated over a four-year period,39 although
schools are required to take an annual audit of their football attendance
and maintain a record of that audit for four years. Last, these new rules
28. Id. § 20.9.6.3(b).
29. Id. § 20.9.6.3.4.
30. Id. § 20.9.6.3.5.
31. Adopted Membership-Division I-A Requirements, at http://www.ncaa.org/
databases/ legislation/2001/2001-123.htm.
32. Division I-A schools can carry eighty-five scholarships per year, with a maximum
of twenty-five new scholarships.
33. "The national service academies are exempt from all financial aid requirements set
forth in Bylaw 20.9.6." 2002-2003 NCAA DIvISION I MANUAL, supra note 3, § 20.9.6.4.1.
34. Adopted Membership - Division I-A Requirements, at http://www.ncaa.org/
databases/ legislation/2001/2001-123.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2003).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See 2002-2003 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 3, § 20.9.6.3.2.
38. Id. § 20.9.6.3.3.
39. Adopted Membership-Division I-A Requirements, at http://www.ncaa.org/
databases/ legislation/2001/2001-123.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2003).
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prevent schools from reaching the attendance minimum through ticket
sales,40 which can often be manipulated through marketing tactics such as
pricing or corporate sponsorship, and force the institutions to find a way
to get "butts in the seats." 41
It would be an error to presume that this change is the sole result of
powerful Division I-A institutions manipulating the system to protect
their own interest at the expense of other NCAA members. In fact, a
remarkable aspect of this change is that it received solid support from
Division I-AA schools, who were "tired of seeing their best programs-
Troy State, Marshall, Idaho and Central Florida-bolt for I-A. ' '42 Not all
Division I-AA institutions have an ambition to move up in classification
and, some of those schools are concerned that such departures have
"weakened the product" of Division I-AA football.43 The result of this
unusual alliance is the creation of a major roadblock for the aspirations of
many Division I-AA programs and an uncertain future for a significant
number of borderline Division I-A programs.
D. AN ANTITRUST PRIMER
Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act, named for its sponsor
Senator John Sherman, in 1890 to assuage some of the economic harms of
the concentration of wealth caused by the Industrial Revolution such as
long hours, high prices, and low wages. 44 Section one of the Sherman Act
seeks to promote competition by preventing collusion among different
players in the market. It outlaws "[e]very contract, combination. . .or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade" and has been applied to such activities as
price fixing, market allocation, boycotts or concerted refusals to deal and
output restrictions. 45 Section two focuses on the behavior of individual
firms in the market by prohibiting monopolistic conduct, attempts to mo-
nopolize, or conspiracies to monopolize, but does not make illegal a mo-
nopoly created by natural market forces. 46 The Sherman Act authorizes
the Department of Justice (DOJ) to seek criminal sanctions for violators
including a maximum fine of $10,000,000 for a corporation or $350,000
and maximum of three years in prison for an individual. 47
Responding to inadequacies in the scope and enforcement of the Sher-
man Act, Congress passed the Clayton Act in 1914, which provides that
any person injured by a violation of "the antitrust laws" may sue the al-
leged violator in federal court and receive treble damages for their in-
40. 2002-2003 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 3, § 20.9.6.3.4.
41. Adopted Membership-Division I-A Requirements, at http://www.ncaa.org/
databases/legislation/2001/2001-123.html.
42. New NCAA Rules Big Hurt on Small Schools, at http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/
761452.asp, (June 3, 2002).
43. Id.
44. See James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in
Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 50 OHIo ST. L.J. 257, 288-98 (1989).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
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jury.48 It also identifies the legal parameters of a cause of action for
specific antitrust practices including: price discrimination, 49 mergers, 50 ty-
ing arrangements, and exclusive dealing contracts.5' In the same year,
Congress also created the Federal Trade Commission (FIC), which now
shares responsibility with the DOJ for enforcing federal antitrust laws.52
In addition to a federal remedy, a person or corporation may also have a
remedy under state law.53
A discussion of the antitrust implications of regulations promulgated
by the NCAA must focus on restraints of trade under section one of the
Sherman Act because of the nature of the NCAA. By definition, the
NCAA is not a monopolist, but the result of a group of competitors who
have combined to place some restraints on the market. This illustrates a
wrinkle in Sherman Act jurisprudence-while the language of the statute
reads, "[elvery contract, combination. . .or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade" is illegal; it would be impractical to take the words too literally.
Such an interpretation of the statute would paralyze business and indus-
try since the nature of every contract is to restrain trade by obligating one
party to another. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Standard Oil Co.
v. United States54 recognized this dilemma and followed pre-1890 antitrust
common law to hold that the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combina-
tions or conspiracies that are "undue" or unreasonable restraints of
trade.55 Since the landmark decision in Standard Oil, this "rule of reason"
has been in an almost constant state of fluctuation as courts struggled to
determine what sort of restraints are reasonable. 56
Some restraints, however, are regarded as so anticompetitive that they
are considered illegal without regard to the actor's motivations. An
agreement "formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, de-
pressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing" prices is presumed to be unrea-
sonable and is considered per se illegal. 57 Defenses that the price "fixed"
is reasonable or that the price constraint is reasonable to protect competi-
tors in the market are rejected. The rule of reason's purpose is not to
determine whether competition is reasonable in a certain market (the
Sherman and Clayton Acts reflect a legislative judgment that competition
is always reasonable), but to determine whether the effect on competition
48. 15 U.S.C. § 15.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 1936).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 14.
52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 45.
53. E.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.05 (Vernon 2001); CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 16750 (West 2002); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 341 (McKinney 2002).
54. 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
55. Id. at 60-62. Although the Court applied a rule of reason analysis in reviewing
Standard Oil's conduct, it still decided to break up the oil conglomerate in what has be-
come the seminal case in American antitrust jurisprudence. Id. at 81-82.
56. See Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 86-87 (8th Cir. 1998); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents
of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102-03 (1984); Ariz. v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457
U.S. 332, 343 (1982).
57. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
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of a particular activity is reasonable. 58 Antitrust laws are meant to protect
"competition, not competitors, '59 and it may be beneficial to consumers
for some competitors to leave the market. Of course, the relationship
between the rule of reason and the per se rule is too complex to succinctly
explain in a few sentences, but an exhaustive recount of their develop-
ment is not necessary for the purposes of this comment. It is enough to
know that two standards exist and the decision to choose one or the other
is often dispositive of the matter.
In addition to price fixing, a concerted refusal to deal, or boycott, is
another type of "contract, combination... or conspiracy" that usually re-
ceives per se treatment by courts. A boycott is defined as "collective ac-
tion by a group of competitors for the purpose of interfering with other
competitors. ' 60 In a traditional horizontal price fixing arrangement, com-
petitors avoid price competition by conspiring to set a price or prices for a
particular product. In contrast, a group boycott occurs when competitors
band together to gain market power and avoid price competition by de-
stroying their rivals. It is often manifested by an agreement not to do
business with the unlucky competitor, generally a common distributor or
manufacturer who has been price-cutting. For example, a group of dress
designers and manufacturers, through their trade organization, agreed to
boycott retailers who sold "knock-offs" of their clothing.61 In one of its
most important decisions concerning group boycotts, the Supreme Court
decided this agreement was a Sherman Act violation and affirmed an
FTC decree ordering the designers to cease and desist.62
III. THIRD DOWN: PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS
A. DOES A CONSPIRACY EXIST?
A threshold question in determining whether antitrust liability will ex-
ist for the NCAA is to determine if there is a contract, combination or
conspiracy in the decision to set standards for Division classification. A
firm cannot conspire with itself or a wholly owned subsidiary because any
two actors have a "unity of purpose. '63 If the NCAA and its member
institutions are considered a single entity, then their conduct falls out of
the realm of section one of the Sherman Act. In Chicago Professional
Sports Limited Partnership v. NBA, the Seventh Circuit held that the Na-
tional Basketball League (NBA) should be treated as a single firm be-
cause it "produces a single product," and cooperation among the teams is
58. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691-92 (1978).
59. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 345 (1962); see Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506
U.S. 447 (1993).
60. WILLIAM R. ANDERSON & C. PAUL ROGERS III, ANTITRUST LAW: POLICY AND
PRACTICE 370 (3d ed. 1999).
61. Fashion Originator's Guild of Am. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 461
(1941).
62. Id. at 465-67.
63. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769, 771, 777 (1984).
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"essential" even if teams have some independent decision-making abil-
ity.6 4 On the other hand, members of the National Football League
(NFL) were considered by the First Circuit to be independent entities
who are capable of conspiring because they "compete in several ways off
the field, which itself tends to show that the teams pursue diverse inter-
ests and thus are not a single enterprise. 65
This is, perhaps, the easiest preliminary question to answer, not only
because it seems intuitive in such a competitive environment as college
athletics, but also because the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the is-
sue directly. In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma, the Supreme Court found that the NCAA is an agreement
among independent member institutions that conspired to place horizon-
tal price and output restraints on the "live college football market" in
violation of the Sherman Act.66 The restraints limited the total number
of televised college football games, limited the number of televised ap-
pearances for any individual team, and effectively precluded price com-
petition by networks for the rights to televise an institution's games. The
NCAA reached agreements with the Columbia Broadcasting System
(CBS) and the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) to broadcast
college football games on alternating Saturdays during the season. Each
network had exclusive negotiating rights for its weekend, but those nego-
tiations were limited in practice by the "minimum aggregate compensa-
tion" of $131,750,000 over four years that the networks had agreed to pay
the member institutions in the NCAA deal. Essentially, there was a sin-
gle buyer for the one televised game of the week for a price that, while
technically negotiated, was limited by the overall contract price and "sug-
gestions" made by an NCAA representative. The plan also prohibited
any one institution from appearing on TV "more than a total of six
times," and "four times nationally," during any two-year period.67 The
members of five major conferences, all NCAA members, formed the Col-
lege Football Association (CFA) and signed an independent television
deal with the National Broadcasting Company (NBC). In response, the
NCAA threatened disciplinary action against the entire athletic program
of any school that complied with the CFA-NBC contract.68
The Court stated that the NCAA is an "association of schools which
compete against each other to attract television revenue, not to mention
fans and athletes" and an agreement among the member institutions lim-
iting television exposures and rights fees is a horizontal restraint of
trade.69 In distinguishing its holding from Board of Regents, the Seventh
Circuit relied on the fact that "the NBA has no existence independent of
sports" and its ability to create new franchises, a power not available to
64. 95 F.3d 593, 598-99 (7th Cir. 1996).
65. Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.2d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994).
66. 468 U.S. 85, 95, 99-100, 113, 120 (1984).
67. Id. at 92-94.
68. Id. at 89, 94-95.
69. Id. at 99.
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the NCAA.70 The common factor in these two decisions is, ironically,
competition off the field, not on the field. Educational institutions are
obviously not created for the purpose of promoting athletic competition,
while the NBA was created for that purpose alone. Since the Supreme
Court's decision, courts have treated the NCAA as a combination of
competitors, capable of conspiring to violate antitrust laws.71 While the
broader holding in Board of Regents significantly impacts the appropriate
standard to apply for antitrust cases involving the NCAA, the preliminary
conclusion that the organization is subject to antitrust scrutiny is critical
before the next step can be taken.
B. DOES ANTITRUST LAW APPLY TO THE NCAA's MEMBERSHIP
REQUIREMENTS?
The next step seems more like a half step. While Board of Regents
clarified that antitrust law does apply to NCAA activities, more recent
decisions have created doubt about which particular NCAA activities are
subject to antitrust scrutiny. The crux of this issue relates to the limita-
tions placed on Congress by the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.72 In fact, the Sherman Act tracks language of the Commerce Clause
in restricting its purview to restraints of "trade or commerce among the
several states, or with foreign states. '73 The NCAA seems to be the ulti-
mate interstate activity, with ties to universities in all fifty states, but some
of its activities are commercial and some non-commercial in nature. The
Act's purpose is to attack or prevent "combinations having commercial
objectives and is applied only to a very limited extent to organizations...
which normally have other objectives. '74
Whether the NCAA's primary purpose is commercial in nature, it is
clear that courts have felt compelled to enforce antitrust laws with respect
to some of the organization's activities. In Board of Regents, the Court
distinguished the television plan, a patently commercial endeavor, from
the NCAA's other rules regarding eligibility, but "did not comment di-
rectly on whether the Sherman Act would apply to the latter. '75 It did
however cite Jones v. NCAA with approval, which held that eligibility
rules were not the subject of antitrust scrutiny.76
Several appellate and district courts have stepped through the door
that the Supreme Court opened. One such case was the result of one of
the most highly publicized scandals in collegiate football history. The
70. NBA, 95 F.3d at 599.
71. E.g., Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); Banks v. NCAA,
977 F.2d 1081, 1090 (7th Cir. 1992); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1024 (10th Cir. 1998).
72. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8, cl. 3.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
74. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 214 (1959); see also Smith
v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 185 (3rd Cir. 1998); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469,
491-93, 495 (1940).




NCAA suspended the SMU football program for the 1987 season and
imposed severe restrictions for the 1988 season following the revelation
that some players were receiving compensation to play for the Mustangs.
In response to this crippling decision for the SMU football program, 77
Davis R. McCormick, an attorney and SMU alumnus, filed a class action
suit on behalf of the institution, its current and previous students, and
members of the football and cheerleading squads. In holding the NCAA's
eligibility rules were reasonable, the Fifth Circuit assumed, "without de-
ciding, that the antitrust laws apply to eligibility rules."78 In affirming the
district court's dismissal of the complaint, the court of appeals also held
the plaintiffs to be without standing, since SMU was not a party to the
suit, but gave them credit "for making a college try."' 79
In contrast, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
refused to issue an injunction restoring the eligibility of Bradford Gaines,
a Vanderbilt football player, for the 1990 season. 80 Gaines had declared
himself eligible for the NFL draft and participated in the leagues annual
scouting combine in Indianapolis, but was not selected by any team dur-
ing the draft. Gaines declaration and his use of a representative to speak
to NFL teams about possible free agent contracts violated the NCAA's
"no-draft" 81 and "no-agent" 82 rules. 83 The court cited the overriding pur-
poses of the NCAA eligibility rules "to prevent commercializing influ-
ences from destroying the unique 'product' of NCAA college football"
and to "preserve the unique atmosphere of competition" between "stu-
dent-athletes" in exempting the eligibility rules from antitrust scrutiny. 84
In doing so, the court specifically rejected the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana's contrary reading of Jones and Board of
Regents. In Banks v. NCAA, a case that challenged the very same NCAA
rules, the Indiana court held that antitrust laws do apply to eligibility
rules, but that the plaintiff had failed to show the likelihood of success
required to receive a preliminary injunction. 85 Banks amended his com-
plaint to permanently enjoin the NCAA from enforcing its "no-draft"
and "no-agent" rules, but to no avail. The Seventh Circuit eventually
held Banks lacked standing to bring the class action since his eligibility
77. Prior to receiving the "death penalty" by the NCAA, SMU had established itself
as a national powerhouse with nine straight winning seasons, including an undefeated 11-0-
1 campaign in the 1982 season. Since its suspension, and the voluntary cancellation of the
1988 season, SMU football has produced just one winning season, in 1997. In the fourteen
years since the school resumed gridiron play, the program has a combined record of 43-83-
2 for a .344 winning percentage. In the fourteen years prior to suspension, including losing
seasons from 1973 through 1975, the program had a combined record of 93-61-4, a winning
percentage of .601.
78. McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1340, 1343 (5th Cir. 1988).
79. Id. at 1340.
80. Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 740, 478 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
81. 2002-2003 NCAA DivisIoN I MANUAL, supra note 3, § 12.2.4.2.
82. Id. § 12.3.1.
83. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 740-41.
84. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 744-45.
85. Banks v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 850, 857, 863 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
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had run out under the NCAA's "five years to play four" rule and he had
failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. 86
In 1998, the Third Circuit held that the NCAA's "Post-baccalaureate
Bylaw" is not the "type of action to which the Sherman Act was meant to
be applied. ' 87 A former volleyball player at St. Bonaventure University
challenged the NCAA's rule forbidding a student-athlete who has gradu-
ated, but not exhausted her eligibility, from competing as a graduate stu-
dent at any institution other than her undergraduate institution.
Although the NCAA is not immune from antitrust prosecution, "eligibil-
ity rules are not related to the NCAA's commercial or business activities"
and, thus, not subject to the Sherman Act. 88
Of special note is the Third Circuit's effort in footnote four to distin-
guish its holding from a recent decision by the Tenth Circuit in Law v.
NCAA, which concerned a challenge of a NCAA bylaw restricting the
salaries of entry-level basketball coaches. A class of "restricted-earnings"
coaches sued the NCAA, alleging that the bylaw was a horizontal price
restraint and a violation of the Sherman Act. The Tenth Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision to grant summary judgment for the plaintiffs
and issue a permanent injunction enjoining the NCAA from "enforcing
or attempting to enforce any restricted earnings coach salary limita-
tions."' 89 In Smith, the Third Circuit noted that the restricted earnings
bylaw in Law "concerned a restriction on the business activities of the
institution, whereas the Post-baccalaureate does not."90
While only a semblance of a rule emerges when all of these cases are
considered together, it does seem clear that courts are comfortable with
separating the commercial from the non-commercial activities of the
NCAA and applying antitrust liability only to the former. Unfortunately,
business activity as a definition for commercial activity does little more
than beg the question. Adding to the confusion is the particular conduct
at issue in this comment-a change in the NCAA's classification require-
ments. While certainly there is an element of protecting the "Athenian
concept of a complete education derived from fostering full growth of
both mind and body," 91 it is impossible to deny the financial ramifications
of a decision that opens or closes the door to substantial financial rewards
for so many member institutions. If rules regarding the eligibility of indi-
vidual student-athletes do not fall under the purview of the Sherman Act,
why are "eligibility" requirements for institutions subject to its authority?
A workable test comes from the U.S. District Court for the District of
Kansas in a suit by the Adidas Corporation to challenge an NCAA bylaw
86. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1084, 1085-86, 1094.
87. Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 185 (3rd Cir. 1998).
88. Id. at 183-86.
89. 134 F.3d 1015, 1024 (10th Cir. 2998). In July of 2000, after eight years of litigation,
the class was awarded $74.5 million in damages, attorney's fees and costs.
90. Smith, 139 F.3d at 186.
91. Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
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governing the use of commercial logos on student uniforms. 92 In deter-
mining whether a NCAA bylaw is commercial, a court should "look to
the underlying purposes of the bylaw... and whether the bylaw confers a
direct economic benefit on the NCAA. '' 93 The court considered the
NCAA's multiple non-commercial purposes in regulating advertising on
student-athlete's uniforms including: (1) "protecting student-athletes
from commercial exploitation;" (2) preserving the integrity and unique-
ness of intercollegiate athletics by preventing student-athletes from be-
coming walking billboards; and (3) avoiding interference with the basic
function of an athlete's uniform-to identify the player and team.94
Under the second prong of the test, the court concluded that the NCAA
did not receive any "direct economic or competitive benefit from the en-
forcement" of the logo bylaw because neither the NCAA nor its member
institutions are competitors of Adidas (despite the fact that an NCAA
logo often competes for space on a student-athlete's jersey). 95
Using the Adidas court's paradigm as a guide, the first step in deter-
mining whether the creation of NCAA Division standards are an appro-
priate subject of antitrust law is to analyze the purposes behind such
conduct. It is necessary to distinguish a general inquiry into the purpose
of creating Division I-A requirements as opposed to the more specific
inquiry into the purposes of changing those requirements. The former is
appropriate to determine if it is proper for a court to take up the matter,
the latter is better left for an analysis of the reasonableness of the re-
straint. Without an affirmative answer to the first question, there would
not be a need to take up the second question.
The NCAA's Constitution lists the fundamental purpose of the organi-
zation as maintaining "intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the
educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student
body and, by so doing, retain[ing] a clear line of demarcation between
intercollegiate athletics and professional sports. '96 Article 2 requires
NCAA legislation to advance one or more of its basic principles includ-
ing: (1) institutional control and responsibility; (2) student-athlete wel-
fare; (3) gender equity; (4) sportsmanship and ethical conduct; (5) sound
academic standards; (6) nondiscrimination; (7) diversity within govern-
ance structures; (8) compliance; (9) amateurism; (10) competitive equity;
(11) recruiting; (12) eligibility; (13) financial aid; (14) playing and practice
seasons; (15) postseason competitions and contests sponsored by non-col-
legiate associations; and (16) the economy of athletics program opera-
tion. 97 In addition, the NCAA's website states that the four goals of the
organization are to: (1) promote student-athletes and college sports
through public awareness; (2) protect student-athletes through standards
92. Adidas Am., Inc. v. NCAA, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1277 (D. Kan. 1999).
93. Id. at 1285.
94. Id. at 1286.
95. Id.
96. NCAA CONST. § 1.3.1.
97. NCAA CONST. §§ 2.1-2.16.
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of fairness and integrity; (3) prepare student-athletes for lifetime leader-
ship; and (4) provide student-athletes and college sports with the funding
to help meet these goals. 98 While the promulgation of Division require-
ments certainly creates an organizational structure that promotes the re-
alization of this exhaustive list of generally non-commercial purposes and
goals, the economic realities of collegiate football cannot be ignored. Di-
vision I-A football is a cash-cow and a primary source of exposure for the
NCAA and many of its member institutions. Standards that include
ticket sales or actual attendance, stadium size, and scheduling size are
based on desires to maximize the earning potential of the college football
market, not, for example, concerns for sound academic standards and di-
versity within governance structure. The tendency to attach a negative
connotation to the NCAA's pursuit of financial success should be re-
sisted. It is not hypocrisy, but a natural consequence of the dual pur-
poses, commercial and non-commercial, served by the NCAA's rules for
classification.
The second prong of the Adidas test prompts the question whether the
NCAA or its member institutions receive a "direct economic or competi-
tive benefit" from the promulgation of minimum requirements for it Di-
vision I-A membership. Two financial benefits come immediately to
mind. First, member institutions with top-tier football programs are di-
rectly profiting through television rights fees and bowl revenue. Second,
by limiting the number of Division I-AA teams a Division I-A team can
play in a season, the NCAA ensures that institutions at the bottom of
Division I-A receive coveted invitations to be early season fodder for the
powerhouse teams. The embarrassment of being badly beaten is usually
alleviated by a hefty financial guarantee by the home team, a practice
that often allows financially strapped schools to more properly fund their
"non-revenue" sports. These "guarantee games" have great value for in-
stitutions trying to move up to Division I-A and institutions trying to
hang on to their current Division I-A classification.
The competitive purposes and the widespread economic benefits of the
NCAA's decision to create minimum requirements for Division I-A foot-
ball programs seem to place the requirements within the purview of the
Sherman Act. Although the NCAA realized some economic and com-
petitive benefits from its restriction on the size and number of logos per-
mitted on student-athlete uniforms, the Adidas court correctly recognized
that gain as an "incidental by-product of the NCAA's legitimate attempt
to maintain the amateurism and integrity of college sports." 99 In the case
of Division I-A requirements, the bylaws require an enormous financial,
facility, and personnel commitment to participate in the NCAA's highest
revenue producing endeavor. The requirements identify and limit the
group of institutions that will receive "direct economic and competitive
benefits" from participation in Division I-A football. While the general
98. The Purposes of the NCAA, at http://www.ncaa.org/about/purposes.html.
99. Adidas, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 1286.
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exemption of eligibility requirements from the Sherman Act raise a ques-
tion as to whether Division requirements are subject to antitrust law, ulti-
mately, the Supreme Court's consideration of the NCAA's television
rights plan in Board of Regents, the Tenth Circuit's consideration of a
bylaw creating a maximum salary for entry-level coaches in Law, and
commercial nature of the endeavor, as seen through the rule articulated
in Adidas, counsel for inclusion of the NCAA's Division I-A require-
ments as an appropriate subject for antitrust review.
C. WHAT STANDARD IS APPROPRIATE?
Once a court decides that the Division I-A requirements are a proper
matter for consideration under the Sherman Act, the next step is to iden-
tify what type of antitrust activity is possibly implicated by the changes in
these requirements and determine under which standard such conduct
will be judged. It is immediately apparent that this is a horizontal re-
straint of trade through an agreement by competitors. The NCAA is not
a single entity, but an association of over a thousand colleges and univer-
sities that compete with one another, on and off the field, who have com-
bined to create market power and stability in the market of college
athletics. A subset of these institutions has agreed to fix new minimum
expenditures and set performance standards for the right to participate in
Division I-A football and receive the benefits involved with such partici-
pation. In other words, the requirements are a conspiracy that excludes
competitors from the market, constituting the quintessential concerted
refusal to deal or boycott. The question remains, however, is it an illegal
conspiracy?
Generally, if the purpose of the agreement between the boycotters is to
limit or exclude competitors and the boycotters possess market power or
exclusive access to a critical competitive element, a court will apply the
per se rule and find the agreement in violation of the Sherman Act. 1°°
Boycotts among competitors without significant market power may re-
ceive a "quick look" or truncated rule of reason analysis to determine if
the agreement has procompetitive justifications that outweigh its proba-
ble anticompetitive effects. 10' Nevertheless, naked price restraints or
output restrictions are generally considered per se illegal, even in the ab-
sence of market power, because of the high probability that they are
anticompetitive. t02
Although the Supreme Court did not describe the agreement in Board
of Regents as a group boycott, 10 3 its application of the rule of reason to a
100. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stoves, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211 (1959).
101. Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 1996).
102. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 100, 110 (1984).
103. The District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma originally held that the
plan was a per se illegal boycott. The Tenth Circuit found no boycott because of the verti-
cal, rather than horizontal, relationship between the NCAA and the television networks.
The Supreme Court ignored the issue in describing the rights plan simply as a horizontal
price and output restriction. See ANDERSON & ROGERS, supra note 60, at 397.
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horizontal price-fixing arrangement is a watershed moment in American
antitrust jurisprudence and paves the way for an analysis of the NCAA's
possible liability in a challenge to the new Division I-A requirements.
The Court's decision to apply the rule of reason was based on its view
that, in the college football market, horizontal restraints were essential if
the product is to be available at all: 104
What the NCAA and its member institutions market in this case is
competition itself-contests between competing institutions. Of
course, this would be completely ineffective if there were no rules on
which the competitors agreed to create and define the competition to
be marketed. A myriad of rules affecting such matters as the size of
the field, the number of players on a team, and the extent to which
physical violence is to be encouraged or proscribed, all must be
agreed upon, and all restrain the manner in which institutions
compete. 105
The Court invited a discussion of procompetitive rationale, but rejected
the NCAA's assertion that proof of market power in the relevant market
is required before anticompetitive effect can be found. In adopting a
"quick look" rule of reason, the court stated that a "naked restraint on
price and output requires some competitive justification even in the ab-
sence of a detailed market analysis.' 0 6 The anticompetitive conse-
quences of some agreements are so readily apparent that "'no elaborate
industry analysis'" is necessary. 10 7
Following Board of Regents, it seems likely that any modern court
would be hesitant to classify an NCAA promulgated rule as a per se ille-
gal boycott, despite the NCAA's apparent control over the Division I-A
football market. Because market power is generally indicative of the
likely success of a boycott, however, the NCAA's control over the Divi-
sion I-A college football market impacts any discussion of the boycott's
reasonableness. 10 8 Instead of a dispositive issue, though, market power
merely serves as one factor among many in the rule of reason analysis. 109
On the other end of the spectrum, boycotts involving conspirators with
no significant market power and no anticompetitive purpose are usually
subject to a full blown rule of reason analysis, placing a burden on the
plaintiff to establish anticompetitive effect in a relevant market."t 0 The
agreement to change the Division I-A requirements is not such a situa-
104. Bd. of Regents, 668 U.S. at 100-01.
105. Id. at 101.
106. Id. at 110; see also NBA, 961 F.2d at 674.
107. Id. at 109 (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
692 (1978)). Although no in depth market analysis was necessary, the Court covered all of
its bases in finding that, "[a]s a factual matter, it is evident that petitioner does possess
market power" in the college football telecasts market. Id. at 111-12.
108. See Fashion Originator's Guild of Am. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 467
(1941).
109. See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998).




tion. Excluding competitors and limiting competition is the fundamental
nature of the Division I-A requirements. A change that works to exclude
even more institutions is patently anticompetitive and aptly falls under
the intermediate "quick look" rule used by the Supreme Court in Board
of Regents.
In applying the "quick look" rule of reason to the restricted earnings
bylaw in Law, the Tenth Circuit articulated the elements of the "quick
look" process as it has evolved from Board of Regents. The first step in
any rule of reason analysis is to identify an anticompetitive effect within a
relevant market. Under the "quick look" rule, anticompetitive effect is
established without determining the relevant market if the plaintiff shows
that a horizontal agreement exists, that "the agreement is effective" and
that the effect of the agreement "is more favorable to the defendant"
than what would have occurred naturally in the market without the re-
straint.1 1' Because only unreasonable restraints violate the Sherman
Act,"12 the defendant has an opportunity to offer procompetitive justifi-
cations for the anticompetitive effects. But, these are considered only "to
the extent that they tend to show that, on balance, 'the challenged re-
straint enhances competition." 13 However, Board of Regents's holding
that horizontal restraints are essential to the existence of college athletics,
and college football in particular, necessitates a limitation on the accept-
able procompetitive justifications. "[T]he only legitimate rationales that
we will recognize in support of the... [r]ule are those necessary to pro-
duce competitive intercollegiate sports."'' 14
The application of the "quick look" rule of reason in Board of Regents
and its progeny represents a mixed bag of advantages and disadvantages
for the NCAA. Although the NCAA certainly prefers the application of
the rule of reason-even the "quick look" rule of reason-to a per se
rule, it was unable to convince any court that all of its activities were non-
commercial and exempt from the scope of the Sherman Act. In both
Board of Regents and Law, despite the deference given to NCAA legisla-
tion, the courts found that the procompetitive justifications offered by the
NCAA did not outweigh the anticompetitive impact. If a future court is
to do the same for the Division I-A requirement changes, it will likely
follow the "quick look" rule of reason as described in Law by identifying
and balancing the benefits of each amendment against its negative impact
on the market for Division I-A football.
IV. FOURTH DOWN: APPLYING THE RULE
On April 25, 2002, the NCAA Division I membership approved new
criteria for classification as a Division I-A member that will become ef-
Ill. Law, 134 F.3d at 1020.
112. See supra text accompanying note 55.
113. Law, 134 F.3d at 1021 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468




fective on August 1, 2004. Thus, Division I-A schools that wish to remain
at that level and Division I-AA schools who hope to move up must meet
these new set of expectations. One article reports that at least thirty cur-
rent Division I-A schools "fall short of some aspect of the new criteria"
and are in danger of being demoted to Division I-AA. 115
The new criteria streamline the previous "Division I-A Football Re-
quirements" in Article 20.9.6 of the Division I Bylaws. When they be-
come effective, the bylaws will require a Division I-A program to (1)
"provide an average of at least ninety-percent of the permissible maxi-
mum number" of football scholarships "over a rolling two-year period;"
(2) play five regular season home football games against Division I-A
opponents; (3) "sponsor a minimum of 16 varsity sports," including a
minimum of six sports for men and a minimum of eight sports for women;
(4) offer 200 athletics grants-in-aid or distribute at least four million dol-
lars in athletics scholarships per year; (5) and average 15,000 in actual
attendance for all home football games.116 In addition to the above re-
quirements, the amendments were also intended to eliminate all waivers
present in the current criteria.1 7
In considering these rationales, the magnitude of scrutiny must be nar-
rowed from the broad discussion of a change in criteria to a focus on the
individual amendments passed by the NCAA. Applying the "quick look"
rule of reason, it is necessary to identify the procompetitive justification
for each new rule to determine if it outweighs the presumed anticompeti-
tive effect of the boycott." 8 Various statements by the NCAA give clues
to possible justifications it might offer. Division I Bylaw 20.9, which was
not amended in the recent changes, provides a list of eight statements
that represent the philosophies endorsed by Division I member institu-
tions. While the list may be overinclusive in that it represents the philos-
ophy of all Division I schools, including those that do not participate in
Division I-A football, its level of detail offers insight into the possible
procompetitive justifications to be offered by the NCAA for its Division
I-A criteria change. The legislative history of the amendments also pro-
vides rationale for the NCAA's decision to make the changes:
The current football classification criteria for Division I-A was [sic]
adopted in 1978, with some revisions to the standards being made in
1981. The Division I-A classification is intended to represent the
highest level of football competition within the NCAA, and as such,
membership requirements should establish standards consistent with
those expectations. This proposal will ensure that Division I-A
members exhibit similarities in the following areas: (a) level of com-
petition (b) resource allocation and (c) public support. The pro-
115. New NCAA Rules Big Hurt on Small Schools, at http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/
761452.asp.
116. Adopted Membership-Division I-A Requirements, at http://www.ncaa.org/
databases/ legislation/2001/2001-123.htm.
117. Id.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
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posed standards will enhance the Division I-A subdivision while
affording deserving institutions the opportunity to participate at the
highest level of Division I-A competition. 19
Last, the NCAA website lists the four goals of the institution: (1) "pro-
mote student-athletes and college sports through public awareness;" (2)
"protects student-athletes through standards of fairness and integrity;"
(3) "prepare student athletes for lifetime leadership;" and (4) "provide
student athletes and college sports with funding to help meet these
goals." 120
The process should be guided by the Tenth Circuit's distinction in Law
that only those rules "necessary to produce competitive intercollegiate
sports" are permissible as pro-competitive justifications.121 It would be
unwise, however, to take the Tenth Circuit's statement too literally. In
truth, very little is "necessary to produce" college sports other than a field
(a court, a track, a pool, a course), sometimes a ball, the athletes, and
maybe a bus to get the players from place to place. Certainly, the court
had more in mind than these minimum rudiments; otherwise, most of the
NCAA's manual would have to be jettisoned. There is an implicit ap-
proval of more than just what is "necessary" to create a "Athenian" sys-
tem of amateur athletics, but also college sports in its modem, coach-
screaming, fan-face-painting, Title IX complying, ESPN Sportscenter
highlighting, in-your-face form. Most importantly, the courts implicitly
accept the NCAA's decision to divide its member institutions into sepa-
rate categories with unequal benefits available to each group. Conse-
quently, any court that considers this issue will likely consider
procompetitive justifications offered by the NCAA that were "necessary"
to protect Division I-A football as the highest profile, highest revenue-
generator, and highest level of football competition within the NCAA,
balanced against the association's obligation to student-athletes and insti-
tutions that do not participate in the sport.
A. NINETY-PERCENT OF THE MAXIMUM FOOTBALL SCHOLARSHIPS
Although paying players is against the rules in amateur sports, athletic
departments do not receive a free ride with their institution when it
comes to their student-athletes. Athletic departments are generally re-
quired to pay their institutions for the scholarships they grant in any
given year. 122 This transaction is often more than just moving numbers to
different places on the balance sheet, as many departments are either
partially or fully self-supported. At many schools, scholarships are the
largest expenses for an athletic department. Football, with eighty-five
119. Adopted Membership-Division I-A Requirements, at http://www.ncaa.org/
databases/legislation/2001/2001-123.htm.
120. The Purposes of the NCAA, at http://www.ncaa.org/about/purposes.html.
121. See supra text accompanying note 114.
122. See Roger G. Noll, The Business of College Sports and the High Cost of Winning,
THE MILLIKEN INSTITUTE REVIEw 24, 28 (Third Quarter 1999).
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available scholarships, but only eleven players on the field at any one
time, is an attractive place to save money by cutting back scholarships
offered.
The requirement that institutions hand out ninety-percent of the
eighty-five football scholarships permitted in any given season 123 reflects
the membership's desire for consistency in the level of competition and,
particularly, resource allocation.124 The level of competition is served by
the rule change because higher quality players will naturally take the op-
portunity to earn scholarship money over paying tuition. It logically fol-
lows that as more scholarships are offered, a lower-tier Division I-A
program will attract more talented players for the bottom half of its ros-
ter than it might have if it only offered, for example, half of the maximum
scholarships allowed. While it is true that only eleven players for each
team are allowed on the field at one time, the violence created by today's
bigger, stronger and faster players requires a modem title contender to
have quality back-ups and a deeper roster.
The desire for consistency in resource allocation is served by limiting
an institutions' football scholarship deficit to within ten percent of the
maximum. Such a requirement demands an equivalent financial alloca-
tion by every institution and prevents a "price-cutter" from offering
fewer scholarships, but riding the coattails of fully funded programs
through splits in television and bowl revenue or by acting as hired punch-
ing bags in "guarantee" games.
The football scholarship minimum also recognizes the "dual objective"
of college athletics to serve the university or college community and the
general public. 125 The success of a college football team has value to
more than just the student-athletes or coaches participating, but also to
its local, regional, and national fan base. The minimum scholarship re-
quirement serves as a proxy for the expectations of those fans who could
rarely have a direct economic impact on the program. The NCAA's in-
terest in maintaining the competitive integrity of Division I-A for the
campus community and the general fan base, as well as recent courts'
deference to NCAA eligibility rules,126 counsel against the assignment of
antitrust liability to a minimum football scholarship requirement.
B. Two HUNDRED ATHLETIC SCHOLARSHIPS OR FOUR MILLION IN
SCHOLARSHIP AID
The new requirement that Division I-A institutions annually offer a
minimum of two hundred athletic scholarships or distribute four million
dollars in athletic scholarship aid is an important complement to the foot-
123. Adopted Membership-Division I-A Requirements, at http://www.ncaa.org/
databases/ legislation/2001/2001-123.htm.
124. See supra text accompanying note 119.
125. 2002-2003 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 3, § 20.9(c).
126. See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1017-18 (10th Cir. 1998); Banks v. NCAA, 977
F.2d 1081, 1090 (7th Cir. 1992).
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ball scholarship minimum. Currently, all Division I programs are re-
quired to provide at least half of the maximum allowable scholarships in
each sport. On its face, the new minimum is the classic example of a
group boycott. Schools that do not spend the lesser of four million dollars
or two hundred grants-in-aid, in addition to the other expenses required
to field a full athletic program, are excluded from the market of Division
I-A football. In reality, it directly addresses the NCAA's mission of pro-
tecting amateur athletics.
With the addition of a football scholarship minimum the Division I
membership's desire for consistency in resource allocation among its Di-
vision I-A colleagues and its belief in offering "extensive opportunities
for participation in varsity intercollegiate athletics for both men and wo-
men" 27 is best served by preventing lower-tier schools from making up
the difference by cutting scholarship funding to less-high-profile sports.
Without such a provision, there would be fewer opportunities for student-
athletes to participate in sports such as soccer, tennis, softball and base-
ball that do not usually generate high revenues at the collegiate level. An
across the board scholarship minimum is an important complement to the
football scholarship minimum because it prevents abuses by a cost-con-
scious athletic program at the expense of student-athletes.
C. SIXTEEN SPORTS
Under the current guidelines, a Division I institution is required to
sponsor fourteen varsity sports, at least seven of which must be women's
sports, 128 unless it demonstrates to the Division I Management Council
that the ratio of male to female enrollment prohibits the institution from
fielding seven women's teams or a lack of student interest prohibits the
institution from fielding a total of fourteen teams. Division I-A schools
are also required to sponsor seven all male or mixed male and female
sports, including football.'2 9 As of August 1, 2004, Division I-A institu-
tions will be required to participate in sixteen varsity sports, including
football, with a minimum of six all-male or mixed teams and a minimum
of eight all-female teams.' 30
Similar to the four million dollars or two-hundred scholarship require-
ment, this change also serves to moderate the effect of the new football
scholarship requirement by protecting the interests of non-football stu-
dent athletes at Division I-A schools. The eight-sport minimum for wo-
men as opposed to the six-sport minimum for men reflects the impact of
the great number of scholarships that are required to go to one all-male
sport, football. No female team requires so many athletes, often making
it necessary for a school to carry more women's sports than men's sports
127. 2002-2003 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 3, § 20.9(d).
128. Id. § 20.9.1.2(a).
129. Id. § 20.9.6.1(a).




to comply with Title IX and the NCAA's rule gender requirements.13'
While it is true that the additional sport sponsorship criteria will "fur-
ther chip away at bottom lines that aren't pumped up by big TV deals and
loads of postseason dough,"'132 three points weigh in favor of a court ac-
cepting the change in sport sponsorship for Division I-A schools. First,
since one of the highest costs of offering any sport is funding the scholar-
ships, the new four million or two-hundred scholarship minimum will
probably set the financial parameter a school must work within. The six-
teen-sport requirement merely offers some internal structure to the distri-
bution of the scholarship money. Second, given the diverse requirements
for sport-sponsorship that already exist between Division I, Division II,
and Division III, it is difficult to imagine any court objecting to another
distinction between Division I and Division I-AA schools. Last, the im-
pact of this change is likely to be minimal. Since the 1981-82 school year,
Division I institutions have sponsored an average of at least seventeen
sports, with the number close to nineteen sports per school in 2000-
2001.133 In fact, Division I schools sponsored an average of 9.0 men's
sports and 9.8 women's sports in 2000-2001.134 The sixteen-sport require-
ment merely recognizes the growth in athletic participation and sports
sponsorship, especially among top-tier athletic programs.
D. FIVE REGULAR SEASON HOME GAMES AGAINST DIVISION I-A
SCHOOLS
Under the current bylaws, a Division I-A football team is required to
play at least sixty- percent of its games against other Division I-A oppo-
nents. 135 The new legislation does not eliminate that requirement, but
adds an additional obligation to play at least five regular season home
games against Division I-A opponents. 136 To qualify as a home contest,
the school must play fifty-percent of their home games in the stadium
where the game played, although an institution is permitted to count a
neutral site game against a Division I-A opponent as a home contest.137
The previous three Division I-A requirement changes focused on creat-
ing and protecting participation opportunities for student athletes, clearly
within the NCAA's obligation to protect amateur athletics and similar in
purpose to its eligibility rules that are protected from antitrust scrutiny.
131. 2002-2003 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 3, § 20.9.1.2.
132. New NCAA Rules Big Hurt on Small Schools, at http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/
761452.asp.
133. COREY BRAY, NCAA SPORTS SPONSORSHIP-NUMBER OF TEAMS 1982-2001 123
(NCAA 2002).
134. Id.
135. 2002-2003 NCAA DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 3, § 20.9.6.2.
136. Adopted Membership-Division IA Requirements, at http://www.ncaa.org/
databases/legislation/2001/2001-123.htm.
137. 2002-2003 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 3, § 20.9.6.2. For example, the
Red River Shootout between Oklahoma and the University of Texas, played in the Cotton




The requirement that a football team play five home games against Divi-
sion I-A opponents, like the change from paid attendance to actual at-
tendance, is a different animal altogether. The focus of these two new
rules is the "product" of Division I-A football and the institutions that
choose to participate, with a somewhat indirect impact on the student-
athletes participating in football and other sports.
This rule change will have the biggest impact on independent schools,
those not affiliated with a conference, and schools in the lower-tier Divi-
sion I-A conferences such as the WAC, MAC and the Sun Belt. In order
to play the minimum number of home games, these schools may have to
give up the revenue generated by playing a guarantee game against a
powerhouse team-an effect that will be felt throughout their athletics
programs. It will limit the ability of a program to increase its profile by
"playing up" in competition since it will be difficult to convince a top-tier
program to give up the revenue it generates in a non-conference home
game and risk a road loss to a less prestigious program. Independent
schools, other than Notre Dame, may find it difficult to convince anyone
to play them at home since top-tier programs do not want to give up the
revenue and lower-tier programs are trying to meet their own home game
minimum. One commentator suggested that teams in the "lesser
leagues" might be required to schedule cross-divisional opponents and
"count them as non-conference games. 138 Essentially, teams would add
home games, probably under reciprocal agreements, against other mem-
bers of their conference that they do not necessarily play every year,
causing a sort of inbreeding of mediocrity.
The NCAA may find it difficult to offer plausible procompetitive justi-
fications for this new requirement. The rationale provided by the NCAA
that the criteria changes are intended to ensure that all Division I-A insti-
tutions are similar in level of competition, resource allocation and public
support seem empty when the effect of the rule change is to make the
gulf between the "haves" and the "have-nots" wider. In fact, this change
increases the challenges faced by lower-tier Division I-A programs by im-
peding two features that make membership advantageous to them, na-
tional publicity through playing high-profile opponents and the financial
windfall of guarantee games. It is difficult to imagine that this change can
be defended by the NCAA's stated goals of promoting, protecting, pre-
paring, or providing funding for student athletes.139 A five-Division I-A-
home-game requirement does not appear to satisfy any of those goals and
may, in fact, lead to less promotion and less funding. It interferes with a
lower-tier Division I-A schools ability to compete and improve its posi-
tion in the market of Division I-A football, but provides almost no
procompetitive effects; especially for those schools it injures most.
138. New NCAA Rules Big Kurt on Small Schools, at http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/
761452.asp.
139. See supra text accompanying note 120.
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E. ACTUAL ATTENDANCE REQUIREMENT
The requirement that all Division I-A schools show an average yearly
home attendance of 15,000 is the most significant and controversial, ele-
ment of the new criteria. The change represents a streamlined, but more
inflexible, approach to football attendance requirements. Under the cur-
rent standard, a Division I-A institution is required to (1) average "more
than 17,000 in paid attendance per home football game" over a rolling
four-year period or (2) play its home football games in a stadium with at
least 30,000 permanent seats and average 17,000 in paid attendance per
home football game once in the previous four years.140 A member has
five waiver options available to them if they cannot meet either of these
requirements. First, the 30,000 permanent seat requirement may be
waived by a two-thirds vote of the Division I-A Management Council if
the institution uses the stadium containing less than 30,000 permanent
seats for fewer than half of its home games.141 Second, an institution that
does not meet the home attendance requirement will automatically retain
its Division I-A classification if it is a member of a conference in which at
least six other conference members sponsor football and more than half
of the football-playing conference members meet the attendance require-
ment. 142 Third, an institution may retain its Division I-A status despite
failing to meet the home attendance requirements if it "averages more
than 20,000 in paid attendance, for all of its games," home and away, as
long as it plays at least four home games during the season. 143 Fourth,
the delinquent institution may receive a waiver of the attendance require-
ments for circumstances beyond its control by a two-thirds vote of the
Division I-A Management Council. 144 Finally, an institution may receive
a waiver of any of the Division I-A criteria by a majority vote of the
entire Division I-A membership. 145 None of these waivers will be availa-
ble when the new requirements become effective.
Of all the new criteria, this change may have the largest impact because
it changes the minimum from a standard that institutions are able to ex-
hibit some control over to a standard that may be predominately out of
their control. Since programs are not required to keep actual attendance
figures, it is impossible to determine exactly how many institutions will be
in danger of losing their Division I-A status, but recent paid attendance
figures offer some guidance. Obviously, the paid attendance figure will
inevitably be higher than the actual attendance as not everyone who buys
a ticket shows up at any given event. In 2000, nineteen schools reported
average paid attendance figures below the current 17,000 mark and four-
140. 2002-2003 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 3, § 20.9.6.3.
141. Id. § 20.9.6.3.1.
142. Id. § 20.9.6.3.2.
143. Id. § 20.9.6.3.3.
144. Id. § 20.9.6.3.4.
145. Id. § 20.9.6.3.6(c).
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teen of those were below 15,000.146 In 2001, fifteen institutions averaged
below 17,000 per home game and ten of those were below 15,000.147 Not
coincidentally, fourteen of the fifteen in 2001 and seventeen of the
nineteen in 2000 were members of the MAC, the WAC, or the Sun Belt.
These numbers, however, are a conservative guess at the schools that will
be affected by the change in criteria. Using 20,000148 in paid attendance
as a guide to identifying those schools at risk of having a poor year that
puts them in danger of losing their Division I-A status, twenty-eight
schools in 2001 and twenty-six schools in 2000 fall short of that mark.
Until the new criteria become effective, all of these schools, including
those below 15,000 have the opportunity to meet waiver requirements
and continue to compete in Division I-A, even if fans decide to stay away
in a particular season. The four-year period over which current attend-
ance figures are judged and the waivers available for members who fall
short of those goals reflect the dynamic nature of attendance figures. In
2001, Bowling Green finished the season with a won-loss record of 8-3
and sold 9,348 more tickets per home game than it did in 2000, when it
finished 2-9, to give it an average of 17,812 in paid attendance. While
improving its record from 6-5 in 2000 to 8-3 in 2001, Middle Tennessee
State sold 7,634 more tickets per home game in 2001 for an average of
17,857. Not surprisingly, the University of Louisiana-Lafayette's ticket
sales dropped 5,168 in 2001 and, its sister school, the University of Louisi-
ana-Monroe, saw ticket sales drop 2,162 in 2001 after both schools en-
dured one-win seasons in 2000. The University of Central Florida (UCF)
perhaps best illustrates the roller-coaster nature of college football at-
tendance. In 2000, UCF finished the season with a record of 7-4 and sold
27,279 tickets, 5,357 more than it did in 1999 when its record was 4-7. But
in 2001, the program sold an average of just 19,967 tickets per home con-
test, a drop of 7,485, despite the fact that its season record was 6-5, just
one win away from the 2000 total.
The change to actual attendance takes control out of the hands of the
institution and puts it in the hands of the finicky fan. The factors that
contribute to these low attendance figures can include low fan base, win-
loss record, the success of other sports teams in the market competing for
the fan's time, the prestige of opponents and the weather. A school that
has made a maximum financial commitment to its football program may
still have its Division I-A status stripped if it hires a poor coach, gets its
star player hurt, or experiences unseasonably cold weather. The subjec-
tive nature of ticket purchasing, much less a fan's decision to show up for
146. 2000 Division I-A Home Football Attendance, at http://www.ncaa.org/stats/football/
attendance/2000iaattendance.html (last visited February 9, 2003).
147. 2001 Division I-A Home Football Attendance, at http://www.ncaa.org/stats/football/
attendance/200liaattendance.html (last visited February 9, 2003).
148. Remember, 20,000 in paid attendance already puts the actual attendance some-
where below that 20,000. The difference in these two numbers can be substantial if, for
example, a snowstorm makes it difficult or extremely uncomfortable for fans that have
already bought tickets to attend.
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the game, must be reflected in the standard the NCAA uses for evaluat-
ing a program through attendance figures. At least with ticket sales as the
standard, programs are able to exhibit some control through marketing,
promotions, corporate sponsorship, and ticket prices. Certainly, all of
these tactics have some affect on actual attendance as well, but paid at-
tendance as a standard at least retains some of the control in the hands of
the institution.
How can the NCAA justify such a decision? It wants competitive eq-
uity but has chosen to do that by getting rid of some of the competitors.
It wants consistency in public support, but ignores the volatile nature of
such a standard. It wants Division I-A football to continue to represent
"the highest level of football competition within the NCAA,' 149 but over-
looks the reality that almost every program experiences feast and famine.
Clearly, the NCAA has the right to set criteria for the division of its
member institutions. But to change these standards, in a way that will
have serious financial consequences on competing institutions in the mar-
ket, the changes must be "necessary" to create the product of Division I-
A football. 150 Whatever force a court will choose to give to the ambigu-
ous nature of that standard, it seems possible that the creation of arbi-
trary criteria and the elimination of sensible waivers could fall short and
be considered a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
V. TOUCHDOWN: CONCLUSION
College football is about entertainment, passion, and fun. It provides a
sensory overload, inspires passion and evokes images unlike any other
spectator sport: the band, the student section, tailgaters, mascots, cheer-
leaders, and fight songs. The sports columnists and the talk shows fill up
our week debating whether to have a bowl system or a playoff system,
who will win the Heisman, the future of a team's coach and a player's
possible pro draft prospects. If we go to the game, we travel hundreds of
miles, paint our faces (and other body parts), and sit for hours outside in
the sweltering heat, pouring rain, or frigid cold. If we stay at home, we
may or may not paint our faces, but we surely organize our life around
the game, and when it arrives, we cheer, scream, stomp, coach, and gener-
ally alienate those around us.1 51
College football is also about business, money and promotion. In 2002,
for the second year in a row, the University of Oregon rented a gigantic
billboard in Times Square to promote its football program. In 2001, the
Ducks placed an 80-by-100 foot picture, with a price tag of $250,000, of
Heisman hopeful quarterback Joey Harrington. Prior to the 2002 season,
the university placed a 53-by-172 foot likeness of senior wide-out Keenan
Howry announcing the school's television deal with the Yankees En-
149. Adopted Membership-Division I-A Requirements, at http://www.ncaa.org/
databases/legislation/2001/2001-123.htm.
150. Supra text accompanying notes 114, 121.
151. The author is speaking from personal experience.
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tertainment and Sports Network to replay Duck games in the New York
Metropolitan area during the college football season. 152
These two sides to intercollegiate athletics make it difficult to apply
antitrust law, a complex area of the law by itself, to the actions of an
organization that is, by its very essence, a collaboration among competi-
tors. Board of Regents stands today as a watershed case in antitrust juris-
prudence for softening the hard edge of the per se rule because the
Supreme Court had to find a way to harmonize the social and business
purposes of the NCAA. That deference would no doubt be reflected in
any consideration of the antitrust liability stemming from the new Divi-
sion I-A criteria. While such deference will likely save some of these
changes, the paucity of procompetitive justifications and arbitrary nature
of the new home game and actual attendance requirements, coupled with
the severe financial consequences of losing Division I-A status, may re-
quire a verdict that the NCAA has violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.
152. Darren Rovell, Oregon Returns to Times Square Bigger than Ever, at http://
espn.go.com/ncf/s/2002/0715/1405999.html. By the way, neither Harrington nor Howry
won the Heisman trophy.
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